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Summary findings
Jur  estimates empiricallv tnc degree to which  the tax  The most robust of the statistical results -using  data
systems of bath  home and host countries  affect foreign  on investment in the United States by ren other countries
direct investrment. He presents evidence that  tax rules  between  1980 and  1989-shows  that  the home-country
significantly affect capital flows from foreign direct  statutory  tax rate significantlv hurts FDI when the
investment  (FDI).  country makes foreign-source  income subject to home-
Home country taxes in particular  appear to  country taxation.  (The same variable has no significant
significantly afiect the behavior of FDI. By identifying  effect on FDI from those countries that exempt  foreign-
the incentives associated with differenr tax paramerers  in  source income  from home-country  taxation.)
the home and  host countries, Jun identifies different  Jun found that  the coefficients of the home countrys
channeis through  which taxes affect FDL  statutorv and effective tax rates take The  opposite sign in
The home-country  stattutorv tax rate is claimed to  the estimated  equations;  this supports the presence of
measure the  incentive effect of potential  home-countrv  different channels through  which  home countrv ta-x
surraxes on new FD1; the home-countrv  effective tax rate  systems influence FDI.
is shown to measure how  taxes  affect the subsritution  of  The weakl  performance  of the host-country  tax variable
investment in one  country for investment in another.  in the estimated equations  suggests that the host-country
The host coiunrrv's effective tax rate should represent  tax does not affect decisions about where  to invest FDI
either the incenrivcs for FDI in that country  or simply  as much as is conventionally  perceived. The host country
the amount  of foreign tax payments tnat  are creditable  tax largely represents creditable  foreign taxes for many
against the home rax liability on the FDI.  investors.
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Tel. (203) 432-3590Taxes  potentially  affect the international  location of
investment  by influencing its relative net profitability  in
different  locations.  Since foreign direct  investment  (FDI)
inevitably  involves the question of overlapping tax
jurisdictions,  the tax treatment of foreign source  income  in the
home country is always an important concern for multinational
firms.  Past debates about the tax effects on FDI have typically
focused on the effective tax rate on foreign source income.
In general, the effective tax rate on foreign source  income
is influenced by the tax systems in both the firm's home and host
countries.  While home countries typically provide  some kind of
tax relief  on their  firms' foreign source income to avoid
potential  double taxation of that income, the nature and extent
of such relief differs across countries and types of investment.
Given a type of investment and the amount of foreign taxes paid
on that investment, therefore, the home country's tax rules will
determine  the effective tax rate on the income from FDI.
Nonetheless,  most previous studies of aggregate  FDI have
1ignored the role of home country taxation in explaining  the
effects of taxes  on FDI-'  The lack of country specific data
has certainly  been arn  excuse for the omission, but many  authors
have taken the further step of establishing a theoretical  case  in
which  "the home country's tax system does not affect FDI."  The
gist of their  argument is that when the deferral of home  taxes on
foreign  earnings  is allowed, FDI financed through retained
subsidiary  earnings will not be affected by the home country tax
rate since the home country's tax equally reduces the return  and
the  opportunity  cost  of such investments.  This is because the
future home taxes on retained earnings are capitalized  into the
value of the firm once those taxes are thought to be an
unavoidable  tax liability.  This tax capitalization  hypothesis
in the taxation  of foreign source income was originally  advocated
by Hartman  (1985) and since then has provided a major theoretical
underpinning  for many ensuing empirical studies; e-g. Hartman
(1984), Boskin and Gale  (1987), Newlon  (1987), Young  (1988) and
Slemrod  (1990)-
The extent to which this hypothesis explains the actual
1  One notable exception is Slemrod  (1990), which studied the
effects  on  FDI  in the  United  States  of  both  U.S.  and  investor
countries'  tax  systems.  Yet the main  focus  of his  analysis  of
aggregate  FDI  was  on  the  impact  of  U.S.  taxation,  while  the
treatment of home country taxation in  his disaggregate analysis was
limited  to  estimated  effects  of  a  measure  of  the  home  country
effective  tax rate.  Boskin and Gale (1987) and Jun (1990) studied
the  effects  of  U.S.  tax  incentives  on  U.S.  direct  investment
abroad, but they had their share of problems by ignoring the host
country tax system.
2behavior  of FDI is an empirical question.2 Yet there exist
several theoretical  cases where the home country's tax system
still matters  for FDI.  First, for marginal  investments  financed
through parent transfers,  the effective tax rate on the
investment  income can still be influenced by the home country tax
system.  Second, even for FDI financed through retained
subsidiary  earnings, the capitalization effects occur-only  when
the home country taxes are perceived to be an "unavoidable".
liability,  which may be a very special case of the reality.3
Third,  the home country tax on certain types of investment  cannot
be deferred.
There  exists still another channel through which home
country taxation  can influence the firm's FDI decisions.  To the
extent that domestic  investment and foreign investment  are
alternative  methods of serving the same objective  (e.g. producing
the same good), the size of FDI can be affected by the
substitutability  between investment locations.  The magnitude  of
FDI, therefore, may be affected not just by the effective tax
rate on the FDI income but also by the effective tax rate on the
income from the same type of investment in the home country.
2  For the  investments  from  countries  where  foreign  source
income  is exempt  from  domestic taxation,  the  effective  tax  rate
depends only on the host country's tax system by definition.
3  The capitalization will occur only if the home country tax
rate is known and perceived to be permanent.  Firms can also employ
various  income  shifting  schemes  to  minimize  home  country  tax
payments  upon repatriation.
3Note that this  "substitution effect" channel is independent  of
the role of home and host country taxation in influencing  the
effective tax rate on the income from FDI.  Surprisingly, most
previous empirical  studies have ignored this effect.
The objective  of this paper is to estimate empirically  the
degree to which the tax systems of both the home and the host
countries have affected FDI.  The data set consists of FDI in the
U.S. made by investors from each of ten other countries  and
related tax data during the period 1980-89.  One key strategy  of
this study is to distinguish  the particular roles of different
tax parameters  in identifying alternative channels for the tax
effects on FDI.
FDI will be affected by more than just tax factors.  Various
other factors will  influence the profitability  of doing business
abroad.  R&D is an important source of comparative  advantages
with which a multinational may expand its activities across
national boundaries.  Exchange rates may influence the firm's FDI
decision by affecting the competitiveness position of the host
country.  In the empirical work, I attempt to control for the
effects of such nontax factors on FDI.
The principal  findings of this study are as follows.  Home
country taxes appear to play an important role in explaining  the
behavior of FDI.  The home country's statutory tax rate, which
4measures the extent to which home country taxation contributes  to
the total tax burden on the income from FDI, has a statistically
significant  effect on FDI across specifications  and alternative
measures of the variables.  When estimated separately for
countries  that exempt  foreign source income from domestic
taxation, the coefficient  of the same variable  is insignificant
as expected.  The finding that the coefficients of the home
country's  statutory and effective tax rates are of the opposite
sign in the estimated equations, supports the presence of
alternative  channels  for the effects of the home country tax
system on FDI.  On the other hand, the performance  of the host
country tax variables  in the estimated equations is mixed  at
best.
The organization  of this paper is as follows:  Section 1
derives the effective  tax rate on the FDI income under  various
assumptions  about institutions and behavior.  Section 2
summarizes  alternative  channels through which home and host
country taxation affect FDI.  Section 3 describes the data used
in the empirical work,  while the empirical results are presented
.in  section 4.  A brief conclusion follows in section 5.
1.  The Effective Tax Rate on Foreign Source Income
One major  concern regarding  international investment  is the
possibility  that foreign source income may be taxed twice,  once
5by the host country and again by the home country.  In general,
the home country can adopt one specific approach or the other  in
order to avoid such double taxation of foreign source  income.
Under the  'territorial' system, the home country does not tax
foreign source  income at all.  France and the Netherlands  have
adopted this approach.  Under the more common  'residence' or
'worldwide'  system, foreign source income is subject to home
country taxation, but a credit or deduction is allowed for taxes
paid to the host government.  Further, the home country tax on
most types  of active foreign business income can be deferred
until the income is repatriated  to the parent.4 Both foreign tax
credits and tax deferrals  influence the effective tax rate on the
foreign source  income and therefore the investment behavior  of
multinationals.
1.1  The Foreign Tax Credit
The foreign tax credit is typically limited to the home
country tax liability on the foreign source income.
Multinationals  whose potentially  creditable foreign taxes exceed
the actual  credit  limit are said to be in an 'excess credit'
4  In some countries  (e.g. the U.S.) the profits of a foreign
branch  are  taxed  on  an  accrual  basis.  Deferral  benefits  are
usually not allowed for passive investment income such as dividends
or interest.
6position.'  Thus, foreign tax credit  limitations are likely to
be binding when the firm invests in a high tax country.  If the
foreign taxes paid are less than the limitation on credits, the
firm is said to be in a 'deficit credit'  (or a 'full credit')
position.
Creditable  foreign taxes include both foreign corporate
income taxes  and foreign withholding  taxes on dividend  and
interest payments.  If the host country effective corporate  tax
rate and the withholding  tax rate on dividends are denoted by t*
and w respectively,  then the creditable foreign taxes  equal  (t* +
(l-t*)w) times the repatriated portion of the foreign source
income.  Due to various  investment incentives, the effective  tax
rate on local investment  (t*) will generally be lower than the
statutory tax rate  (denoted by u*) in the host country unless  the
adverse effects  of inflation are very large.
Since home country investment incentives are typically  not
extended to,  capital invested abroad 6, the home tax liabilities  on
the foreign source income can be approximately determined  by the
home country statutory corporate rate, denoted by u, multiplied
5  In  some  countries,  these  excess  credits  may  be  carried
backward or forward  (two  and five years respectively  in the U.S.).
In Korea, excess credits cannot be carried back or forward to other
years.  In lieu of claiming foreign tax credits  (at  the limitation
amount), taxpayers may elect to treat all foreign taxes paid as a
tax-deductible  item.
6  In other words, the home country defines taxable  foreign-
source  income based on some approximation to economic income.
7by the income.  If withholding taxes are ignored, the foreign tax
credit position will then be approximately determined by the
relative magnitude of the home country statutory tax rate vs. the
host country effective tax rate. 7
This intuitive result has received surprisingly  little
attention  in the past literature.  Many previous debates about
the credit position have focused on the comparison of a set of
"comparable" tax rates--namely either comparing the statutory  tax
rates of different countries  (u and u*) or comparing the
effective tax rates  (t  and t*).S  The failure to distinguish  the
particular  roles of different tax rates will be especially
problematic  in performing  an empirical investigation of FDI.  As
stressed in this study, each of these four tax parameters may
assume  a distinctive role in identifying alternative  channels for
the tax effects on aggregate FDI.
1.2  Tax Deferrals
In addition to providing foreign tax credits, residence
system countries typically allow their firms to defer the home
country tax on certain types of foreign source income until the
7  I will ignore withholding taxes in the following discussion
for simplicity.
I  't' denotes the home country effective tax rate.
8income  is repatriated. 9 Tax deferral can be an important  source
.of  tax benefits  since it may lower the effective tax rate on
foreign  investment  under certain circumstances.' 0
A central  issue in determining the benefits  from home tax
deferrals  is the method  of financing marginal  foreign investment.
Related to this is the subsidiary's credit status.  A foreign
subsidiary  can either draw transfers from its parent  or retain
its earnings  to finance investment at the margin."
suppose that a subsidiary draws parent transfers  to finance
its marginal  investment.  If the subsidiary  is in a full credit
position  (i.e. u >  t*)1 2 , the firm can lower the effective  tax
rate  on foreign earnings to the extent that it can defer home tax
payments  (which are higher  than foreign taxes on the same
9  In general, active business incomes belong to this category.
Income  from  passive  investment  (dividends  and  interest,  for
example) are typically taxed on the accrual basis.  Most countries
do not allow the tax deferral  for foreign branch  income.
10  Unlike  the foreign tax credit, which  is designed to avoid
double  taxation of foreign source income, tax deferrals  have been
a source of controversy  in some investor countries since they give
multinationals  a tax  incentive to keep placing  their  earnings  in
foreign countries.  A recent U.S. tax bill (H.R. 5270:  The Foreign
Income Tax Rationalization  and Simplification Act of 1992) includes
a provision  which repeals tax deferral.
11  Subsidiaries  which have access  to well-developed  capital
markets  can also rely on local borrowing as the marginal  source of
funds.
12  Note again that this condition is a simplification  of the
more  complicated  reality.
9income).  It can be shown that the effective tax rate on the
foreign source  income is a weighted average of u and t* with
weights  being the dividend payout ratio  (denoted by d),
(l-d)t* +  du.1 3
If this subsidiary becomes mature enough to cover  its
investment  expenditures by retaining its earnings, the deferral
benefits  will increase to the point where the effective tax rate
on foreign  investment is t*.  To the extent that the home country
taxes  on the retained earnings are an unavoidable  liability in
the sense that those taxes-have to be paid at some point in the
future, those home taxes will be capitalized into the value of
the subsidiary.  Retained subsidiary earnings are a cheaper
source  of funds than parent transfers, since the opportunity  cost
of investing  out of retained earnings becomes lower than that for
transfers  by the present value of the future home taxes on the
retained  amount.  As far as taxes are concerned, therefore,
subsidiaries  in a full credit position should exhaust retained
earnings  as the source of investment firancing before drawing
transfers  from their parents.  The effective tax rate on foreign
investment  financed through retained earnings thus becomes t*.
Note that  in this case the home tax rate  (u)  will not affect the
effective tax rate on foreign source income. 14
'3  See Jun  (1989) for a proof.
14  This hypothesis is analogous to the standard capitalization
argument  developed  in  the  context  of  the  effects  of  dividend
taxation on the cost of capital for the domestic corporation.  For
10Note, however, that a subsidiary can lower the effective  tax
rate on its investment only when it faces higher tax payments  in
the home country  (i.e. a full-credit position, u > t*).  If the
firm is in an excess credit position  (u  < t*), the effective  tax
rate on foreign source income will become t* regardless  of the
timing  of income repatriation.  Also, as noted earlier, not every
type of foreign source income is eligible for the deferral
benefits.' 5 If a firm is in a full credit position and no
deferral  is allowed, then the effective tax rate is equal to the
home country tax rate  (u).
Table  1 breaks down the effective tax rate on foreign source
income by the financing method and the credit position.  If a
foreign subsidiary  is either in an excess credit position  or from
a territorial  system country, the tax consequence  is trivial.
When a firm is from a residence system country.and  in a full
credit positi'on,  the effective tax rate can be significantly
influenced  by the financing method and the deferral practice. 6
a more rigorous treatment of this subject, see again Jun  (1989).
15  See footnote 9.
16  Multinational  firms typically attempt to avoid  an excess
credit  position.  One possibility  is that  the  firm  changes  the
debt-equity  mix  of  parent  transfers  in order  to  generate  more
interest expenses in the subsidiary.2.  Alternative  Channels for the Tax Effects on FDI
The analytical result summarized in Table 1 suggests that
investment  incentives available in the home country  (measured by
t) and the host country  statutory tax rate  (u*) should not
significantly  affect the effective tax rate on the income from
FDI.  The relative importance of the two relevant tax variables,
t* and u, in determining  the tax burden on FDI income hinges  on a
variety of behavioral  as well as institutional factors.
Yet this result does not reflect the possibility  that
t and u* can influence FDI through other channels.  Indeed, the
effects of the tax systems of the home and host countries on FDI
cannot be adequately  summarized by the effective tax rate on FDI
income alone.  one important distinction between a purely
domestic  firm and a multinational  firm is that the latter
typically has alternative  locations for investment.  This choice
of locations may be affected by the relative net profitability  in
the firm's home and host countries.  The importance of local
investment  incentives can be represented by the effective tax
rates on domestic investment  in each location  (t and t*).  If the
effective tax rate on foreign source income and the pretax rates
of return  in the two locations are denoted by tfsi,  r and r*
respectively,  then the multinational firm will compare r(1-t)  and
r*(I-t!')  to determine the investment location.  As indicated  in
Table  1  tfsi  is a weighted  average of u and t* with weights  lying
12between  zero and unity.  To the extent that the substitution
between  locations  is sensitive to the relative net rates of
return,  FDI  can  be  affected  by the home country effective  tax
rate  (t), which deviates from the home country statutory rate  (u)
due to the presence  of investment incentives and the
distortionary  effects of inflation.
In summary, the two home country tax variables  (u and  t)
effectively  represent the two channels --  the effective tax rate
on FDI and the location-substitution  effect, respectively  --
through which home country taxation affects FDI.  Note, however,
that these two variables have opposite implications for the
incentives  to  undertake  FDI.  The  home  country  statutory  rate  (u)
is expected to measure  a disincentive effect on doing business
abroad,1 7 while the home country effective tax rate  (t) will
measure  an FDI incentive caused by taxation of domestic
investment  in the home country.  This result illustrates  that a
naive analogy between the tax effects on domestic and foreign
investment  can be quite misleading.  While a reduction  in the
statutory  rate  (u) and an increase in investment subsidies  (lower
t for a given value of u) would both boost incentives  for
domestic  investment, the same tax changes would  generate
offsetting  incentives for FDI.  This analytical  implication  is
specifically tested by including both variables  in an estimated
17  If the  investor  is from a  territorial  system  country, u
does not measure this effect as shown in Table  1.
13equation  in section 4.
This new approach of assigning a distinctive  role to each
tax parameter  in explaining the behavior of FDI sharply deviates
from the conventional  treatment of home and host country taxation
in the literature.  As properly stressed in Slemrod  (1990, p.
82), the empirical  research has been extremely one-tracked.  For
example, most  of the studieslS  on FDI in the United  States have
practically  repeated the same specification adopted  in Hartman
(1984),  in which  the role of home country taxation was  either
theoretically  ruled out or empirically untractable.' 9 Even in
the exceptional  cases, 20 the home country's effective tax rate
was the only variable representing the role of home country
taxation,  although the effective tax rate alone cannot  adequately
capture alternative  channels for the effects of home country
taxation  on FDI.
18  See the citation about the literature  in section 1.
19  These  studies typically  estimated the response  of inward
FDI to tax  incentives  available  in the United  States,  separately
for investment  financed through retained  subsidiary  earnings  and
parent  transfers.  This  practice  of  decomposing  FDI  into  two
financing-types  was  motivated  by  the  implication  of  the  tax
capitalization  argument  that  home  country  taxation  does  not
influence the effective tax rate on the income from FDI financed by
retained earnings.  As sunmarized in Slemrod (1990),  the results of
these studies,  often inconsistent with each other, have  failed to
support  the  hypothesis.  Strangely,  the  hypothesis  was  often
adopted as an "explanation" for the lack of significant  effects of
a home  country tax variable  in some studies which  include such a
variable.
20  See footnote 1.
14The host country statutory tax rate  (u*), which  assumes  no
role in explaining the real investment behavior of a
multinational,  may still affect FDI capital flows through yet
another channel.  In addition to affecting the real investment
decisions  of multinationals,  taxes may influence the firms'
financial behavior.  Multinationals  have an incentive to shift
their taxable income towards countries with lower tax rates.
They can do this not only through manipulation of the transfer
prices, but also through such devices as the location of
ownership of corporate patents.  Multinationals may also want to
generate tax deductible expenses in the country where  the
deductions  are most valuable.  The gain from shifting a given
amount of taxable income or deductible  expenses is proportional
to the absolute value of the difference in the marginal tax rates
on the income accruing in each country.  In the empirical work, I
measure  this  transfer pricing effect by the absolute difference
in the statutory corporate tax rates of the related countries
(abs  (u-u*)).
Many nontax factors also affect FDI.  Since FDI suggests the
acquisition  of both ownership and control over the foreign  firms,
there may exist synergy gains from joint operations of the
domestic and foreign firms.  A flrm which owns some distinct
products  and technologies may want to expand its operations
internationally  to exploit such advantages.  I proxy  the degree
to which  firms in one country own distinct products or
15technologies  by a measure of R&D effort in that country.
Exchange  rates may influence the firm's FDI decision  by affecting
the competitive  position of the host country.  The relative  size
of the home country or the business cycle condition  in the home
country may also influence FDI.
3.  Data
In order to test the sensitivity of FDI flows to tax
incentives,  we have collected data on the relevant tax and nontax
variables  in the  U.S.  and  ten  other  industrial  countries  for  the
period  1986-1989.  The data set also includes FDI flows  into the
U.S.  from each of these other countries.  The ten investor
countries  are Australia,  Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands,  Sweden, Switzerland, and the U.K.
Specifically, the investor  (home) country characteristics
are represented  by u,  to  R&D intensity  (R&D) and the relative
size of GDP  (RGDP), for each of the ten investor countries.  The
host country  (U.S.) variables  include u*, t*, the real exchange
rate  (REXC) and the capacity utilization rate  (UCAP).
u  and u*:  In each case, we used the statutory rate that
applied to the largest firms for each country in each year.  Data
of these rates  came from Coopers and Lybrand's International  Tax
16Summaries.  When state or provincial  governments  in that country
also taxed  corporate profits, we used a combined tax rate.  This
approach does not take into account the possibility  that firms
may have tax losses, and so face a zero marginal tax rate, or be
subject to supplementary taxes, e.g. an alternative  minimum tax.
When the statutory tax rate changed during the calendar year, we
used a weighted  average tax rate.
t:  We measured the effective tax rate on domestic
investment  in the host country by the ratio of direct taxes on
income to operating  surplus less net interest paid for the
nonfinancial  corporate  sector, as reported in the "Accounts  for
Non-Financial  Corporate and Quasi-Corporate Enterprises"  in the
OECD's National Accounts  1976-89.  kn alternative measure  for
this variable  is the effective tax rate based on the user cost of
capital,  constructed  using information about corporate  tax
provisions.  Slemrod  (1990) adopted this measure  in his
disaggregate  analysis.  As argued in Bradford-Fullerton  (1981),
this measure  of the effective tax rate can be very sensitive  to
assumptions  made about such things as the required rate of
return.  In order to find a consistent tax measure which  is less
sensitive to country-specific  factors, we used the OECD average
tax rate as the base case measure.
t*:  By definition,  this is the effective corporate tax rate
on foreign holdings  in the U.S.  Most firms operating  in the U.S.
17will have  at least some foreign owners, though the fraction will
vary  by firm.  we simply assumed that the effective  tax rate on
foreign holdings  is the same as that on firms as a whole
operating  in the U.S., regardless  of ownership, and so measured
t* as the ratio of actual corporate tax payments to a i.easure  of
economic  income  in the base case."' Since this variable
represents  the key parameter  for the host country tax effects on
FDI, we also tried a couple of other measures  of the U.S.
effective  tax rate in an effort to mitigate the concern  about the
measurement  issue.  We used the OECD average tax rate as the base
case.  The second measure used is an updated series of the
effective  tax rate reported in Feldstein and Jun  (1987).  This is
the series that many past empirical studies have used  in their
empirical  estimation.  The other alternative  is the effective  tax
rate based  on the user cost of capital, the same time series  as
used  in Slemrod  (1990), and which was originally reported  in
Auerbach  and Hines  (1990).
R&D  intensity:  We measured the home country's R&D intensity
in year t by the average value in a country of R&D/GDP during
years t-3 to t-l-
21  Grubert, Goodspeed, and Swenson (1991),  however, found that
the average tax rate paid by foreign subsidiaries  in the U.S. was
much less than that paid by other firms.  I assume that this is due
to financial arbitrage engaged in by these firms, measured  in this
study  by  abs  (u-u*), rather  than  due  to  differences  in  the  tax
treatment  of foreign-owned  firms.
18RGDP:  This relative GDP variable is the ratio of each
investing country's real GDP to U.S. real GDP.  The real GDP data
is taken from an updated version of the series reported in
Summers and Heston  (1988).
REXC:  For each country, it is the product of the nominal
exchange rate  (foreign currency/U.S.$) and the ratio of GDP
deflators  (U.S. GDP deflator/foreign  GDP deflator).
UCAP:  This variable measures the U.S. capacity utilization
rate reported  b-y  the Federal Reserve Board.
Lastly, data for FDI from each of the ten investor countries
into the United States are needed.  This country-specific  data
is taken  from various issues of the Survey of Current Business,
published  by the U.S. Commerce Department.  This FDI time series
was constructed  by extrapolating the benchmark survey data, which
has been ccllected occasionally  (1959, 1974 and 1980).  Since we
used 1980-89 as the sample period, the FDI data used in this
paper does not suffer from the problems associated with the
changing definitions  and the differing sample coverage from one
survey to the subsequent ones.2-
22  This  balance  of payments  FDI data does  not  necessarily
represent  real  capital  expenditures  by foreign  affiliates.  In
fact, this measure, which consists of retained subsidiary or branch
earnings and parent  transfers, can be accurately  thought of as a
measure of financial transactions between affiliated parties.  For
a  more  detailed  discussion  of  direct  investment  data,  see  Jun
(1990)
194.  Estimation
This section presents the estimated equations  relating  FDI
in the United  States to the tax and nontax variables  described  in
section 3.  The ratio of FDI in the United  States to U.S. GDP is
used as the dependent variable  in the estimated equations.  We
first pooled  the data from all sample countries and estimated
various specifications.  Then we divided the whole  sample  into
two tax system groups  (residence and territorial)  and tested  the
same specifications  for each group. 2'  This disaggregate  analysis
will shed  further light on the role of home country taxation  in
explaining  FDI.  The predicted  sign of the estimated  coefficients
are summarized  in Table  2.  The effects of u on FDI are expected
to be significant  for the residence system countries  but
insignificant  for the territorial  system group.  For the
residence  system countries, the estimated coefficients  of the two
home country tax rates  (t and uj are expected tc have the
opposite  sign.
23  In  the  estimated  equations,  the  FDI-GDP  ratios  are
multiplied  by 1000.
24  Among the ten sample countries, four countries  --  Canada,
France, the Netherlands, and Germany --  belong to the territorial
system  group.  The Netherlands  and France  are territorial  -s-tem
countries, while Canada and Germany exempt U.S. source income from
domestic  corporate  taxes  by a  tax treaty.  Italy  uses  a  hybrid
system, exempting a  certain fraction of repatriated  foreign source
income  from domestic  corporate taxes.  I tried three  alternative
combinations:  (1)  Italy in the residence system group;  (2)  Italy in
the  territorial  system  group;  and  (3) Italy  omitted  from  both
groups.  Since the results were qualitatively similar, I report the
results  for the first case only.
20The regression  results for all sample countries are
presented  in Table  3.  In the OLS regression  (column 1), the
coefficient  of u is of the expected sign and is statistically
significant.  The effective tax rates of the home and host
countries  (t and t*) are both of the expectsd sign but are not
statistically  significant.  The coefficient  of abs(u-u*)  is of
the wrong  sign and statistically  insignificant.  Nontax  variables
all have correctly  signed and statistically  significant.
coefficients.
Studies generally  indicate a lag between changes  in the
determinants  of investment and subsequent  changes in investment.
We lagged the explanatory  variables one year to test for delayed.
responses  to changes in incentives.  Since We did not collect tax
data for 1979, the regression had to be run with data from 1981-
1989.  The resulting  coefficients from this lagged regression
appear  in column 2 of Table 3.  The t-values for t and t* are
larger and the statistical fit is slightly better.  Since
differences  from the original specification are minor,  We chose
to focus  on the contemporaneous  specification  in order to avoid
the loss of degrees of freedom.
Both of these regressions were estimated using OLS.  Yet OLS
is appropriate  only if the error terms in the regression  are
homoskedastic  and independent across observations.  Given the
21panel nature of the sample, however, the error terms for a given
country may be correlated over time, due for example to omitted
random  or fixed effects.  Ignoring these correlations,  at the
very least, results in biased estimates of the coefficient
standard errors.  If omitted country effects are correlated  with
the included independent variables, then the initial coefficient
estimates  are themselves  biased.
To test for the importance of these possible problems,  We
reestimated  the initial equation using both a fixed-effects
estimator  and a random-effects estimator.  The coefficient
estimates  resulting  from the fixed effects specification  are
reported  in column 3 of Table 3.  As is apparent from the jump in
the adjusted R 2, these country effects are highly  significant  as
a group.  If the country effects are uncorrelated  with the
other included variables,  then a random effects estimator would
be appropriate.
Most coefficient  estimates that result from the fixed-
effects procedure  do not differ significantly from those
resulting  from OLS.  The coefficient of u is again of the
expected sign and statistically significant.  The coefficients  of
R&D,  RGDP,  REXC  and UCAP are all of the expected sign as in OLS,
2  The  value  of  the  F  statistic  for  omitting  the  country
dummies  in the fixed effects procedure is 5.3, compared with a 5%
significance  level of about 1.35.
22but they are no longer  significant.  The coefficients  of t and t*
have both changed sign but are still statistically  insignificant.
The most significant  change from the OLS specification  is the
coefficient  of abs(u-u*), which is now of the expected sign and
statistically  significant.  As reported in column 5 of Table  3,
the random  effects results are very similar to those for the
fixed effects estimator.
In order to capture the cross-sectional variation  in the
data, We also report  results from a between effects regression  in
column  4 of Table 3, in which the averages of home country
variables  over the ten year period are used.  The estimated
equation  naturally  includes only the investor country variables.
Given the small number  of countries in the sample, it is not
surprising  that t-statistics for the coefficient  estimates are
low.  Again,  the estimated coefficient of u has the expected
sign.
In order to focus on the role of home country taxation
in explaining  FDI, We estimated the same specifications
separately  for each of the two tax system groups.  One key
differing  aspect of these two systems is the effect of u on FDI.
Since the home country tax system does not affect the effective
tax rate on foreign source income, the effect of u  on FDI is
expected to be negligible  in an estimated equation using
23territorial  country data.  The results are reported  in Table  4.26
The results  for residence system countries  (columns 1 and 2)
are very  similar to the results for all sample countries.  In the
fixed effects model,  the coefficients of every tax variable  are
now of the expected sign.  The results for territorial  system
countries  are reported  in the last two columns of Table 4.  Most
importantly,  the coefficient  of u  is insignificant.  The
.coefficients of t and t* are statistically significant  but of the
wrong  sign.  These results, combined with the corresponding
results for the residence system group, strongly support the
theoretical  implication that it is the home country statutory  tax
rate that determines  the extent to which home country taxation
contributes  to the tax burden on the FDI income.
In the estimated  equations presented so far, the performance
of the host  country effective tax rate  (t*) is mixed  at best.
expected  results.  Especially puzzling is the result  for the
territorial  system countries since t* is expected to play  a
relatively  more important rcle for this group.  In order to test
for the sensitivity  of the results to the measurement  of the
effective  tax rate, We estimated the same specifications  using
the two additional  measures of t* discussed  in section 3.  As
reported  in Table 5, the results are pretty robust  to the choice
26  I report  onlv the OLS and the fixed effects results.
24of the effective tax rate measure.7
In summary, the most robust result across all specifications
and alternative measures of variables is that the home country's
statutory tax rate has a highly significant negative coefficient
in the estimated equations for the residence system group.  This
result is supplemented by the finding that the coefficient  of the
same variable is insignificant in the regression for the
territorial  system group.  Another interesting finding is that
the coefficients of t and u, the home country tax variables, are
of the opposite sign in the estimated equations.  This result
may vindicate the theoretical case made in this study that
each tax rate assumes a distinctive role in identifying
alternative channels for the etfects of home country taxation on
FDI.  The weak performance of the host country tax measures  in
the  estimation  contrasts  with  some  previous  findings.2 S
2  I report the OLS results.  The results are also robust with
respect  to the  choice  of the  tax measure  in the  fixed  effects
specification.
-8  For  example,  the  results  in  Slemrod  (1990)  generally
supported  a  negative  effect  of  U.S.  effective  tax  rates  on
aggregate  FDI.  Unlike  the  panel  estimation  performed  in this
paper, his study used a time series data set, 1956-84.  The resuits
of other studies were not as strong as those of Slemrod.
255.  Conclusions
The evidence presented in this paper confirms that home
country taxation has had a significant effect on FDI.  This
result sharply contrasts with the conclusions of past studies
which have not supported any systematic effect of the home
country's tax system on FDI either empirically or on theoretical
grounds.  By suggesting various alternative channels for the tax
effects, this paper disputes the popular theoretical  claim that
the home country's tax system does not matter for FDI financed
through retained subsidiary earnings.
The main approach taken in this study is to distinguish  the
particular roles of different tax parameters  in identifying
alternative  channels for the tax effects on FDI.  Specifically,
We  argue  that  the  home  country  statutory  tax  rate  measures  the
effect  of  home  country  taxation  on  the  income  from  FDI
originating  in a residence system country, while the home country
effective  tax  rate  measures  a possible tax effect on the
substitution between domestic.and foreign investment.  On the
other hand, the host country's effective tax rate should
represent  the investment incentives of undertaking FDI or the
amount  of creditable foreign tax payments, depending on the
investor's home country policy toward foreign source income, the
type of investment, and the firm's credit status.
26In order to shed light on the relative importance of home
and host country taxation in explaining FDI, We have estimated
various specifications which relate FDI into the United States
from ten other countries during the period 1980-1989 to relevant
tax and nontax variables.  The most striking finding is that the
home country statutory tax rate has had a significantly negative
effect on FDI from the residence system countries in the sample.
This result is robust to the choice of specification and tax
measures, and is supplemented by the finding that the same
variable has had no significant effects on FDI from the
territorial system countries.  The finding that the coefficients
of the home country's statutory and effective tax rates are of
the  opposite  sign  in  the estimated equations supports the
presence  of  alternative  channels  for  the  effects  of  the  home
country  tax  system  on  FDI.  The weak performance of the  host
country  tax  variables  in  the estimated equations, coupled with
the  mixed  results  in  the  previous  literature,  may suggest  that
the  host  country  tax  does  not  affect investment incentives as
much  as  conventionally  perceived  but  largely represents the
amount  of  creditable  foreign  taxes  for  many  investors.  The
findings  of  this  study  also  suggest  a  need  to  pay more balanced
attention to the  role  of  both  the  home  and host country's tax
systems in evaluating the tax effects on FDI.
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29Table  1.  The  Effective Tax Rate  on  Foreign  Source  Income
Retained  Parent  No
earnings  transfers  deferral
Residence  system
Deficit credit  t*  du+(1-d)t*  u
(u  >  t*)
Excess  credit  t*  t*  t*
(u  <t*)
Territorial system  t*  t*
No'tes:
t*:  Host country  effective tax rate
t  Home  country  effective  tax rate
u  : Home  country  statutory  tax rate
d  : Dividend  payout  ratLeTable 2.  Predicted Sign of Estimated Coefficients
Predicted sign  Data used in estimation
t*  'U.-  S. effective tax rate
t  +  Home  country effective tax rate
u  -/0  Home  country  statutory tax rate (residence/territorial)
abs(u-u*)  +  Difference in statutory corporate tax rates
R&D  +  Home  country  R &  D-GDP ratios
RGDP  ?  The ratio of home  country GDP to  U.S. GDP
REXC  - Real exchange rate (foreign currency / U.S.$)
UCAP  +  U.S. capacity utilization rateTable 3.  Regression Results for All  Sample Countries
OLS  Lag  Fixed  Between  Random
effects  effects  effects
(1)  j(2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Constant  -2.525  -1.516  0.744  -9.852
(-1.04)  (-0.56)  (0.35)  (-1.58)
t*  -0.864  -2.143  0.489  -0.124
(-0.48)  (-1.17)  (0.77)  (-0.08)
t  0.475  0.584  -0.148  0.851  -0.029
(1.42)  (1.63)  (-0.42)  (0.60)  (-0.09)
u  -5.775  -6.375  -5.707  4.340  -5.085
(-4.33)  (-3.98)  (-3.08)  (-0.93)  (-3.21)
abs(u-u*)  -1.764  -1.110  3.080  1.778
(-0.97)  (-0.52)  (1.89)  (1.14)
R & D  33.900  39.960  32.792  59.063  26.996
(1.84)  (1.96)  (0.95)  (1.19)  (1.05)
RGDP  5.647  6.221  13.041  4.239  5.137
(5.25)  (5.30)  (0.95)  (1.26)  (2.45)
REXC  -0.001  -0.001  0.001  -0.0003
(-2.42)  (-2.49)  (0.97)  (-0.83)
UCAP  6.095  5.475  4.265  4.511
(2.13)  (1.70)  (1.43)  (1.88)
Adjusted
R-squared  0.32  0.34  0.66  0.38  0.16
Notes: 1. t-statistics are in parentheses.
2. The dependent  variable is FDI  x 1000/  U.S. GDP.
3. The regression using lagged independent variables is based  on 90 observations,
1981-1989 by 10 countries; all others are based on 100 observations,  1980-89
by 1  0 countries.
4. For the between effects model, standard  R-squared is reported.Table 4.  Regression Results by Tax System
Residence system countries  Territorial system countries
OLS  Fixed  OLS  Fixed
effects  effects
(1)  (2)  (1)  (2)
Constant  -2.205  -3.943
(-0.67)  (-1.85)
-3.563  -1.298  2.034  3.892
(-1.40)  (-0.47)  (1.73)  (2.16)
t  0.671  0.105  -0-661  -0.984
(1.09)  (0.22)  (-1.96)  (-2.53)
u  -6.876  -6.737  1.074  0.717
(-3.73)  (-2.45)  (0.68)  (0.36)
abs(u-u*)  -3.195  4.710  -3.352  -3.693
(-1-27)  (1.98)  (-2.11)  (-225)
R & D  34.934  35.780  36.901  60.756
(1.51)  (0.81)  (1.76)  (0.94)
RGDP  7.694  13.498  -7.75  -19.253
(6.25)  (0.45)  (4.84)  (-1.5
REXC  -0.001  0.001  -0.054  -0.031
(-2.44)  (0.89)  (-1.56)  (-0.39)
UCAP  7.140  5.442  5.040  -2.123
(1.79)  (1.20)  (2.63)  (0.81)
Adjusted
R-squared  0.48  0.70  0.73  0.73
See note to Table 3.Table 5.  Altenative Measures  of U.S. Effective  Tax Rate (t*)
OECD  Feldstein-Jun  Auerbach-Hines
Average tax rate
(1)  (2)  (3)
(All sample countries)
t*  -0.864  -0.893  -0.805
(-0.48)  (-0.47)  (-0.80)
t  0.475  0.469  0.482
(1.42)  (1.41)  (1.45)
u  -5.775  -5.773  -5.718
(-4.33)  (-4.32)  (-4.29)
(Residence  system countries)
t*  -3.563  -3.053  -2.467
(-1.40)  (-1.31)  (-1.75)
t  0.671  0.602  0.693
(1.09)  (0.99)  (1.15)
u  -6.876  -6.832  -6.775
(-3.73)  (-3.70)  (-3.71)
(Territorial system countries)
t*  2.034  1.663  0.972
(1.73)  (1.31)  (1.44)
t  -0.661  -0.713  -0.707
(-1.96)  (-2.07)  (-2.09)
u  1.074  1.068  0.776
(0.68)  (0.67)  (0.48)
See  note to Table 3.Table  6.  Altenative  Measures  of  FDI Ratios
FDI  FDI  FDI
U.S.GDP  U.S.Investment  Foreign  GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)
Constant  -2.525  -0.088  28.924
(-1.04)  (-0.90)  (1-05)
t  - - --0.864  -0.077  12.818
(-0.48)  (-1.06)  (0.63)
t  0.475  0.022  -4.889
(1.42)  (1.61)  (-1.28)
u  -5.775  -0.246  -71 .745
(-4.33)  (-4.54)  (-4.701
abs(u-u*)  -1.764  -0.059  -26.185
(-0.97)  (-0.80)  (-1.26)
R &  D  33.900  1.449  436.027
(1.84)  (1.94)  (2.07)
RGDP  5.647  0.227  -12.905
(5.25)  (5.21)  (-1.05)  -
REXC  -0.001  -0.00002  -0.004
(-2.42)  (-2.26)  (-1.31)
UCAPUS  6.095  0.245  7.934
(2.13)  (2.11)  -(0.24)
Adjusted
R-squared  0.32  0.33  0,35
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